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I. THE DEBATE SURROUNDING
CARNIVORE AND ITS PERCEIVED
THREAT TO FOURTH AMENDMENT
RIGHTS AS IT APPLIES TO INTERNET
COMMUNICATIONS
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution explicitly provides individuals the
right to be secure from unreasonable searches
and seizures.' This right to privacy is not absolute,
as courts have established certain exceptions to
the rule that all searches and seizures must be
conducted with a court-issued warrant. 2 For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has found that while
there is a right to privacy in the contents of tele-
phone calls, 3 there is no right to privacy in tele-
phone call records. 4 Indeed, the Constitution is
celebrated in part because of the Founders' intent
that it be applied and construed in a flexible man-
ner with the ability to adapt to changing circum-
stances. 5 However, technology ushered in with the
new millennium has brought to fruition the fears
that Justice Brandeis articulated in 1928 that
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("[T]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.").
2 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
3 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 (1967).
4 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46.
5 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). ("[G]eneral limitations on the
powers of government.., do not forbid... meeting modern
conditions by regulations which 'a century ago, or even half a
century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary
and oppressive.' Clauses guaranteeing to the individual pro-
tections against specific abuses of power, must have a similar
capacity of adaptation to a changing world."). Constitutional
protections should not be limited to guarding against ex-
isting evils because to be perpetual, they must also protect
"[w] ays may some day be developed by which the
government, without removing papers from secret
drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by
which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the
most intimate occurrences of the home."'6 More
specifically, the flexible approach in delineating
the extent of privacy rights under the Fourth
Amendment combined with the explosion of the
Internet as a unique communications medium
has brought society to a crossroads where serious
Fourth Amendment policy decisions must be de-
termined. 7
In today's world of electronic life, the advance-
ment of the Internet has facilitated the unfortu-
nate development of a new area of criminal activ-
ity.8 As a result, issues remain unresolved
concerning the application of constitutional
rights to online activities, especially the privacy
and security of Internet communications. 9 The
fact that existing statutes governing electronic sur-
veillance are ill-suited to the Internet is particu-
larly pertinent when one considers Carnivore, the
against that which may become an evil. Id. "Time works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.
Therefore, a principal to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth." Id. at
472-73.
6 Id. at 475.
7 See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore'
Program: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/davi0724.htm (2000) (testimony of
Alan B. Davidson, Staff Counsel for the Ctr. for Democracy
and Tech.) [hereinafter Davidson].
8 See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore'
Program: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/kerr0724.htm (2000) (statement
of Dr. Donald M. Kerr, Assistant Dir. of the FBI) [hereinafter
Kerr] (noting that criminals often use telecommunications
to plan and execute their activities).
9 See Davidson, supra note 7.
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FBI's new Internet wiretapping system.' 0 Privacy
rights are threatened because as the law stands
now, Internet communications receive minimal
Fourth Amendment protection.l" The tremen-
dous advancements in Internet technology that
encourage the widespread transfer of private data
have greatly affected law enforcement because
more information is available that could prove to
be valuable evidence in government investiga-
tions.' 2 Moreover, advanced technology has al-
lowed law enforcement to develop improved
methods and devices to track electronic commu-
nications. 3 For example, with a court order, the
FBI can use Carnivore to monitor and record the
Internet traffic of suspected criminals in order to
collect evidence. 14 Carnivore possesses the ability
to scan millions of e-mail messages per second-
an alarming development because it may include
access to more data than what is legally permissi-
ble under current law. 15 Meanwhile, the public
has little knowledge of Carnivore's full capabilities
and civil rights groups are demanding a public re-
view of the system's source code.'" Specifically, ad-
vocates of Fourth Amendment rights argue that
electronic surveillance of Internet communica-
tions should not come at the expense of constitu-
tional rights to privacy. 17 Conversely, the FBI and
DOJ rehash the argument that severe restrictions
on Carnivore's uses will "make society suffer and
give criminals greater immunity than has been
known heretofore." '8
This comment examines the government's new
electronic surveillance device known as Carni-
10 See id. To date, Carnivore has not been implicated in
an actual case of a Fourth Amendment violation, but the
threat of a potential violation is substantial enough to make
examining this issue worthwhile.
I See id.
12 See id.
I See id.
14 See Fourth Amendment Issues Raised by the FBI's 'Carnivore'
Program: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., at http://
www.house.gov/judiciary/corn0724.htm (2000) (testimony
of Robert Corn-Revere, Partner, Hogan & Hartson, LLP)
[hereinafter Corn-Revere] (expressing concern that Carni-
vore will be able to capture the content or headers of e-mail
messages from both the targeted user and other peripheral
users exceeding the permissible scope of a trap and trace or-
der); see also Davidson, supra note 7. Proponents argue that
using Carnivore to obtain such information as e-mail con-
tents or headers is analogous to a pen register or trap and
trace device that can be obtained under a low legal standard,
but opponents argue it is equivalent to a wiretap, which re-
quires a showing of probable cause and includes judicial
oversight.
vore, in particular, its effect on the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures. First, this comment estab-
lishes that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence re-
stricts the government's ability to use surveillance
tools to intercept information contained in pri-
vate communications. Next, this comment asserts
that Carnivore threatens to exceed the bounds of
permissible government surveillance of private In-
ternet communications. Finally, this comment
concludes that Congress must redefine the bal-
ance between an individual's Fourth Amendment
rights and the needs of law enforcement by
strengthening the statutory framework pertaining
to electronic surveillance of private Internet com-
munications.
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND
FEDERAL LAW
A. Olmstead v. United States- Fourth Amendment
Implications of Wiretapping
1. Olmstead Majority View
Olmstead v. United States19 was the first case that
discussed the permissible scope of wiretapping in
the Fourth Amendment context.20 The broad is-
sue that the Supreme Court considered was
whether evidence obtained through telephone
wiretaps constituted a violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 2' In convicting Olmstead, the gov-
ernment had relied on information obtained
15 See Davidson, supra note 7.
16 See D. I. Hopper, An Internet 'Carnivore,'
ABcNEWS.coM, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/
tech/dailynews/carnivore0727.html (July 27, 2000)
17 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 358 ("[T]he concept of an 'inci-
dental' search cannot readily be extended to include surrep-
titious surveillance of an individual either immediately
before, or immediately after, his arrest." (citing United States
v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 71-79 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting))). Exceptions to Fourth Amendment protections in-
clude searches and seizures conducted incidental to the ar-
rest or in hot pursuit. Katz, 389 U.S. at 358.
18 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 468; see also Kerr, supra note 8
(noting that lawful electronic surveillance is an important
tool because it allows law enforcement entities to collect and
present evidence of the suspect's own words).
19 277 U.S. 438.
20 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 438.
21 Id. at 455-56. Private telephone conversations between
the defendant and others led to a conviction for conspiring
to violate the National Prohibition Act. The defendants were
convicted of unlawfully possessing, transporting, importing
and selling intoxicating liquors. Defendants ran a lucrative
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from telephone conversations intercepted with
wiretaps. 22 The intercepted phone conversations
revealed the nature of the defendant's illegal ac-
tivity, including the identity of partners, subordi-
nates and customers.23 The information obtained
by government officials formed the basis for an in-
dictment and subsequent conviction for criminal
conspiracy.24
Chief Justice Taft, writing for the Olmstead ma-
jority, recounted the basis of Fourth Amendment
case law.25 Chief Justice Taft's discussion included
Weeks v. United States,26 in which the Court held
that a search or seizure without a warrant violates
the Fourth Amendment. 27 Most evidence ob-
tained without a warrant is inadmissible and must
be returned to the aggrieved party.28 Without
such a rule, the Weeks Court held that the Fourth
Amendment would be meaningless and ineffec-
tive in protecting individual liberties. 29 The Olm-
stead Court considered this rule in light of the fact
that the defendants had made continued and vol-
untary use of their telephones without knowing
operation with sales exceeding $176,000 per month or $2
million per year. Olmstead was the general manager of the
operation, netting half of the proceeds for himself. The oper-
ation was based in Seattle, WA, and made use of three tele-
phone lines to receive and fill orders.
22 Id. at 456-57 (noting that "[s]mall wires were inserted
along the ordinary telephone wires" connected to the defen-
dant's various telephones, and the wiretaps were put into
place "without trespass upon any property of the defend-
ants").
23 Id. at 457.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 458-59 (quoting Justice Bradley in Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-22 (1886), who noted that
in the absence of an actual search and seizure, the Fourth
Amendment is not violated by compelling the production of
private effects to support a criminal charge).
26 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
27 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 460 (discussing Weeks, 232 U.S. at
383 and the approval it gave to Justice Field's opinion in Ex
parteJackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1877), which held that the
Fourth Amendment's requirement for a warrant supported
by oath and affirmation applies to sealed pieces of mail).
28 Id. at 460 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383); see also
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385
(1920) (stating that seized materials must be returned when,
following an arrest, government officials searched and seized
materials in violation of the Fourth Amendment); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921) (holding that private
property seized by government officials in the absence of a
warrant should be returned and could not be used as evi-
dence); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (hold-
ing the admission into evidence of material obtained without
a warrant at the defendant's home located several blocks
from the place of arrest violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause the search and seizure at the defendant's home was not
incidental to the arrest); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
about the wiretaps that the government officials
had used to intercept their conversations. 3 0 In
contrast to previous Fourth Amendment cases,
Olmstead presented a situation in which there was
no actual entry into a defendant's private home
or office, and no tangible items were seized or
searched.3 '
Based on the distinction that telephone conver-
sations are unlike pieces of mail, which are tangi-
ble personal effects and to which the Fourth
Amendment provides protections, the Olmstead
Court held that the evidence obtained by wiretap-
ping defendants' telephones did not violate the
Fourth Amendment.3 2 The Court refused to find
that the wiretaps involved a search or seizure be-
cause there was no actual entry onto defendant's
private property.3 3 The Court did note, however,
that Congress has the power to make a law ban-
ning the admission into evidence of intercepted
telephone conversations.3 4 Courts have no such
power and in the absence of such a law, they
could not find the government's actions in Olm-
298 (1921) (holding that evidence taken from the defen-
dant's private office during a bogus friendly visit constituted
a violation of the Fourth Amendment and therefore was
inadmissible into evidence). The holding in Gouled was lim-
ited by Olmstead to the particular set of facts presented be-
cause the bogus entry was equivalent to a forced entry. Olm-
stead, 277 U.S. at 463.
29 Weeks, 232 U.S. at 383; Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463 (not-
ing that the underlying reason for this rule stems from the
historical purpose of the Fourth Amendment to protect
against abuse of government power regarding the search and
seizure of an individual's home, person, papers and effects).
30 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 462.
31 Id. at 464. This presented a novel issue because, textu-
ally, the Fourth Amendment concerns the search and seizure
of material things.
32 Id. The Court refused to extend Fourth Amendment
protection to telephone wires because the wires are not part
of an individual's private effects. In this regard, the Court
takes a literal approach to the construction of the Fourth
Amendment by relying on its holding in Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), that "the Fourth Amendment is
to be construed in the light of what was deemed an unrea-
sonable search and seizure when it was adopted." Caroll, 267
U.S. at 149. Chief Justice Taft wrote that the scope of the
Fourth Amendment cannot exceed the "practical meaning of
houses, persons, papers, and effects, or so to apply the words
search and seizure as to forbid hearing or sight." Olmstead,
277 U.S. at 465. See also Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57
(1924) (holding that while officers of the law trespassed onto
the defendant's property, "there was no search of person,
house, paper, or effects," and thus no Fourth Amendment
violation).
11 Olnstead, 277 U.S. at 464 ("The evidence was secured
by the use of the sense of hearing and that only.")
M Id. at 465-66.
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stead to be in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.35 Therefore, Chief Justice Taft reasoned
that the Court could not expand unilaterally the
Fourth Amendment's scope to include searches
and seizures of intangible material that is freely
available outside the home.3 6 The ultimate result
in Olmstead was a declaration that, within the rule
set out in Weeks v. United States, using a wiretap
without a warrant is constitutional.3 7
2. Olmstead Dissent
Justice Brandeis dissented from the majority's
view in Olmstead and wrote that the government's
wiretapping constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.38 Justice Brandeis cast the issue as whether
the wiretapping constituted a search and seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 39
An affirmative answer would make wiretapping, in
the absence of a warrant, unlawful and would
have the effect of making evidence obtained with
a wiretap inadmissible.'41 Justice Brandeis wrote
that the Founders designed the Constitution to
last for eternity and intended it to have the "ca-
pacity of adaptation to a changing world." 4' Bran-
deis reasoned that the Founders knew that unan-
ticipated threats to constitutional rights would
arise; therefore, they had intended that the Con-
stitution be flexible so that it could remain an ef-
fective protection against both present and future
threats to individual liberties. 42 In keeping with
the Founder's intent, Justice Brandeis stressed
that Supreme Court precedent "in giving effect to
the principle underlying the Fourth Amendment,
has refused to place an unduly literal construction
35 Id. at 466.
36 Id. (holding that telephone use involves passing
messages outside the home and thus is outside the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection).
37 Id. at 465.
38 Id. at 478 (Brandeis, j., dissenting).
39 Id. at 471-72 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
40 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 472-73 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (relying on
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910), for the
idea that the Constitution "must be capable of wider applica-
tion" and "should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to
the form that evil had theretofore taken").
42 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("Time works changes,
brings into existence new conditions and purposes . . . [So]
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of
what may be." (quoting Weenu, 217 U.S. at 373)).
43 Id. at 474, 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (noting that
upon [the Fourth Amendment]." 43 In this light,
the wiretapping in Olmstead presented only one of
many new methods by which the government
might be more capable of infringing on personal
liberties.44 Therefore, according to Brandeis' dis-
sent in Olmstead, courts must fulfill the Founders'
primary goal of preserving the essence of the
Fourth Amendment's protection of personal lib-
erties against government infringements, no mat-
ter what their form. 45
Brandeis also argued that when considering the
degree of Fourth Amendment protection to af-
ford telephone conversations, such conversations
are analogous to pieces of mail.46 Both telephone
and mail services are publicly available means of
communication, however, "the one is visible, the
other invisible; the one is tangible, the other in-
tangible; the one is sealed, and the other un-
sealed, but these are distinctions without a differ-
ence."
47 Therefore, to preserve the principles
underlying the Fourth Amendment and to main-
tain its effectiveness, courts should find a violation
of Fourth Amendment rights whenever the gov-
ernment intrudes unjustifiably on an individual's
privacy, even when there is no physical seizure of
personal effects.48 Brandeis' dissent stressed that
an infringement of Fourth Amendment rights is
inexcusable even when government is performing
law enforcement duties because "[e]xperience
should teach us to be most on our guard to pro-
tect liberty when the government's purposes are
beneficent."'49 If the cost is the loss of individual
liberties, Brandeis believed that it is better that
some criminals go free rather than all criminals
be caught by government encroachment on
Fourth Amendment rights. 50
the principles underlying the Fourth Amendment "apply to
all invasions on the part of the government ... of the sancti-
ties of a man's home and the privacies of life" (quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. at 616)).
44 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
45 Id. at 475 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (relying on Boyd,
116 U.S. at 616).
46 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
47 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
48 See id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (citing Silverthorne
Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (holding
that an officer's reading of a private paper is a Fourth
Amendment violation even though the officer did not seize
or touch the paper, and therefore the paper is inadmissible
as evidence)).
49 Id. at 479 (Brandeis, I., dissenting).
51 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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Justice Butler also dissented in Olmstead, finding
the government's use of a wiretap without a war-
rant to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. 5 1
Justice Butler saw the issue as whether the govern-
ment could, in keeping with the Fourth Amend-
ment, intercept private telephone conversations
without a warrant. 52 In reaching this conclusion,
Justice Butler rejected the government's claim
that wiretaps do not constitute a search for evi-
dence. 53 Justice Butler interpreted liberally the
Fourth Amendment's protection of individual lib-
erties, finding that wiretaps violate individual con-
stitutional rights.54
B. Katz v. United States: Warrantless Wiretaps
Violate the Fourth Amendment
Nearly forty years passed before the Supreme
Court reconsidered its position in Olmstead on the
permissible scope of wiretapping under the
Fourth Amendment. In Katz v. United States,55 peti-
tioner was indicted for violating a federal statute
forbidding the transmission of wagering informa-
tion by telephone. 56 The conviction turned on the
government's introduction of evidence obtained
by using an electronic listening and recording de-
vice. 57 The recordings were of Katz's side of tele-
phone conversations made from a public tele-
phone booth. 58 Katz presented two vital questions
for Supreme Court review. 59 One issue was
whether, under the Fourth Amendment, a public
telephone booth is a constitutionally protected
51 Id. at 488 (Butler, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 486 (Butler, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 488 (Butler, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 487-88 (Butler, J., dissenting) (citing Boyd, 116
U.S. at 616, and stating that the reason behind the precedent
of a broad interpretation is that the literal meaning of words
within the language of the Fourth Amendment cannot fully
represent the intended scope or policy).
55 389 U.S. 347.
56 Id. at 348. The Court considered 18 U.S.C. § 1084
(1994), which provides:
(a) whoever being engaged in the business of betting or
wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility
for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing
of bets or wagers . . . shall be fined no more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1084.
57 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348; see generally Katz v. United States,
369 F.2d 130 (9th Cir. 1966) (affirming the conviction and
holding that the mode by which the recordings were ob-
tained did not violate the Fourth Amendment's protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures because there was
no physical intrusion into the phone booth used by Katz).
area requiring the government to obtain a war-
rant before recording telephone conversations
made from the booth. 60 The second issue was
whether, under the Fourth Amendment, physical
intrusion of a protected area is a necessary ele-
ment in establishing an unconstitutional search
and seizure. 6' The Court stated that "the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places," and
"what [Katz] seeks to preserve as private, even in
an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected. ' 62 The government claimed
that because the telephone booth was constructed
of transparent glass, Katz was as visible inside as
he would have been outside the booth. 63 The
Court found this assertion irrelevant because the
purpose of entering the enclosed telephone
booth was to preserve the privacy of the spoken
word and not to prevent visibility.64 Moreover, the
Court held that a person carries with them into a
public telephone booth the full panoply of Fourth
Amendment protections.65
The government also asserted that even if a per-
son in a public telephone booth carries with them
Fourth Amendment rights, these rights were not
implicated because the recording device did not
involve a physical intrusion of the booth.66 Based
on Olmstead, this argument stated that Fourth
Amendment protections are not implicated when
there is no search or seizure of tangible effects. 67
In finding no merit to this argument by the gov-
ernment, the Katz Court stated that "the under-
pinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so
58 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
59 Id. at 349.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 351 (discussing the application of the protec-
tions provided by the Fourth Amendment).
63 Id. at 352.
64 Id.
65 See id. The Fourth Amendment protects the privacy of
conversations made in a public telephone booth because,
"[w]herever a man may be, he is entitled to know that he will
remain free from unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. In-
terpreting the Constitution to say otherwise "is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in pri-
vate communication." Id.
66 Id. (relying on Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 because the re-
cording device was attached to the top of the telephone
booth, and at no time did government officers or their equip-
ment enter the booth while Katz was inside).
67 Id. at 352-53 ("Neither ... hold the Fourth Amend-
ment to have been violated... unless there has been an offi-
cial search and seizure of his person ... or his tangible mate-
rial effects." (referring to Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466)).
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eroded... [that they] can no longer be regarded
as controlling. 68 Subsequent cases "have ex-
pressly held that the Fourth Amendment governs
not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends
as well to the recording of oral statements over-
heard without any technical trespass."69 This proc-
lamation makes the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion irrelevant to the consideration
of whether a search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment.70 As a result, the Court held that re-
cording Katz's phone conversations made from
the public telephone booth "constituted a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment.'" 71 In so doing, the Court reasserted
that it was irrelevant to constitutional considera-
tions that the recording device did not physically
intrude the area within the telephone booth.72
Having found that the recording of Katz's tele-
phone conversations constituted an unlawful
search and seizure, the next issue that the Court
addressed was whether the government had com-
plied with the Fourth Amendment in conducting
the search and seizure. 73 In its analysis, the Court
noted that a magistrate could have issued a lawful
68 Id. at 353.
69 Id. (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505,
511 (1920)).
70 See id.
71 Id.
72 See id.
73 Id. at 354. The government admitted into evidence six
recordings of Katz's end of the telephone conversations in
which the content involved "the placing of bets and the re-
ceipt of wagering information." Id. at 354 n.14.
74 Id. To maintain safeguards against government in-
fringements upon personal liberties requires the government
to notify the magistrate of the need for the search, specify the
plan of action, and indicate the precise evidence to be
searched and seized. Here the search and seizure was of a
narrow enough scope that the magistrate could have consti-
tutionally granted such permission. Id. "A federal court may
empower government agents to employ a concealed elec-
tronic device 'for the narrow and particularized purpose of
ascertaining the truth.' " Id. at 355 (quoting Osborn v.
United States, 385 U.S. 323, 329 (1966)). The Katz Court
noted that the purpose of requiring court permission is to
ensure that searches and seizures do not extend beyond what
is necessary under the circumstances. Id. (citing Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41, 87 (1967)). See also FED. R. CRiM. P.
41 (d). See generally Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23, 37
(1963) (holding that when the government has authorization
to conduct a search and seizure, advance notice to the per-
son subject to the search and seizure is not necessary in cases
where such notice would destroy the government's opportu-
nity to search or seize evidence).
75 Katz, 389 U.S. at 356; see also Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 (1963) (holding a search and
seizure executed in the absence of proper authorization is
warrant to search and seize Katz's telephone con-
versations using an electronic recording device.7 1
The fact that government agents failed to get this
kind of warrant made the search and seizure an
unjustified violation of Katz's Fourth Amendment
rights. 75 Therefore, the Court held that the re-
cording of Katz's telephone conversations consti-
tuted a violation of the Fourth Amendment and
overturned his conviction. 76
C. What Does the Law Provide on Government
Use of Electronic Surveillance?
1. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 196877
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968 set forth procedures by
which government officials could obtain federal
court authorization for real-time interception of
the content of electronic communications. 78 Con-
gress wanted to enact strict limitations on the use
of electronic surveillance to ensure the protection
of individual privacy rights. 79 Under Tide III, au-
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
76 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359; see also id. at 361 (Harlan,J., con-
curring). When considering the degree of Fourth Amend-
ment protection afforded to a defendant, courts should con-
sider whether the person had an expectation of privacy and
whether society would consider that expectation reasonable.
Applying this to the present case reveals that Katz had (1) an
expectation of privacy while using the public telephone
booth and (2) that this expectation was reasonable. Moreo-
ver, government can be guilty of infringing upon privacy by
both electronic and physical intrusions. Id. See also id. at 363
(White, J., concurring). But see id. at 366 (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing, in accordance with Olmstead, that a conversa-
tion is not tangible and not within the accepted meaning of
the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures).
77 Title Ill, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212 (1968) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). This stat-
ute is commonly known as the federal wiretap statute. See 18
U.S.C. § 2510(8) (defining the contents of communications
to be "any information concerning the substance, purport, or
meaning of that communication")
78 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (1994 & Supp. V 1998);
see also id. at § 2511 (providing a civil cause of action against
any person who violates the wiretap law); Annotation, When
Do Facts Shown As Probable Cause For Wiretap Authorization Under
18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(3) Become "Stale," 68 A.L.R. FED. 953
(1984); Janet Boeth Jones, Annotation, Propriety of Monitoring
Telephone Calls To or From Prison Inmates Under Title III of Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act Prohibiting Judicially Unau-
thorized Interception of Wire or Oral Communications, 61 A.L.R.
FED. 825 (1983); 74 AM. JUR. 2n Telecomm. § 212 (1974).
79 See 74 Am. JUR. 2) Telecomm. § 212 (1974) (citing
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972)).
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thorization to intercept the contents of electronic
communications using a wiretap is only available
for certain enumerated offenses.80 Government
agents seeking an order to intercept the contents
of electronic communications must include in the
wiretap application a statement of the facts justify-
ing the issuance of the order, a statement showing
that other investigative means have been em-
ployed and the period of time that the order will
be in force."' The statute also requires that gov-
ernment agents make a showing of probable
cause before a court can authorize the intercep-
tion of the contents of electronic communica-
tions. 82 The court's order must identify the spe-
cific communications to be intercepted, the
surveillance target, the location of the target's In-
ternet Service Provider ("ISP") and the particular
government agency authorized to conduct the in-'
terception.8 3 Courts also can require the govern-
ment to provide regular progress reports detailing
the type of data collected and any future need for
continued use of the wiretap. 84 Both the exclu-
sionary rules of the Fourth Amendment and the
wiretap statute found in Title III prohibit the use
of evidence obtained in violation of the proce-
dures for intercepting the contents of electronic
communications. 8 5
80 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; see also Kerr, supra note 8
(explaining that a federal magistrate cannot authorize the
use of a wiretap, and interception of electronic communica-
tions is limited to specific enumerated felonies).
81 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) ("Each application for an or-
der authorizing or approving the interception of a[n] ...
electronic communication ... shall be made in writing upon
oath or affirmation to a judge of competent jurisdiction.");
see also Kerr, supra note 8 (noting that electronic surveillance
has played a role in convicting more than 25,600 felons over
the past thirteen years).
82 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (requiring government agents
to show probable cause in three different contexts). The
judge may authorize interception of wire, oral or electronic
communications if the judge determines that:
(a) there is probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit a par-
ticular offense enumerated . . . ; (b) there is probable
cause for belief that particular communications concern-
ing that offense will be obtained through such intercep-
tion; (c) normal investigative procedures have been
tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely
to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous; (d) ... there
is probable cause for belief that the facilities from which,
or the place where, the wire or oral communication are
to be intercepted are being used, or are about to be
used, in connection with the commission of such of-
fense.
Id. at § 2518(3).
83 Id. at § 2518(4).
2. Amending Title III: The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 ("ECPA ")86
To understand why Congress found it necessary
to amend Title III by passing the ECPA, one must
examine how the Fourth Amendment fared
under Tide III. In United States v. New York Tele-
phone Co.,8 7 the Court stressed the limitations on
the collection of information through pen regis-
ters. It also considered the issue of whether a fed-
eral district court could order a telephone com-
pany to provide assistance to federal law
enforcement agents in order to implement a
court-authorized pen register.88 Pen register de-
vices "disclose only the telephone numbers that
have been dialed."89 Surveillance using pen regis-
ter devices cannot reveal the contents of commu-
nications, the identities of the parties involved
"[or] whether the call was even completed."90 The
Court held in New York Telephone Co. that Title III
(the federal wiretap statute) does not govern the
use of pen registers because these devices do not
intercept the contents of communications. 91
In Smith v. Maryland,92 the Supreme Court con-
sidered whether a pen register constituted a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment. There, the Court held "that there is no con-
84 Id. at § 2518(6).
85 See id. at § 2518(10).
86 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 18 U.S.C.)
87 434 U.S. 159 (1977).
88 Id. at 165. The U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York authorized the FBI to install a pen regis-
ter on two telephone lines and directed the New York Tele-
phone Co. to assist in the installation and implementation of
the court's order. The order was based on probable cause
that the telephones were being used in conjunction with an
illegal gambling enterprise. The telephone company's refusal
to comply with the court's order lead to subsequent litiga-
tion. Id.
89 Id. at 167 (finding that a pen register decodes tele-
phone numbers by "responding to changes in electrical volt-
age caused" by the dialing of numbers on a telephone).
90 Id. (noting that pen registers do not hear sound); see
also Brown v. Waddell, 50 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 1995) (fol-
lowing the Court's holding in New York Tel. Co. and reassert-
ing that the only capability of the pen register and trap and
trace devices is to intercept dialed telephone numbers).
91 New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167. The case's holding
applies to trap and trace devices as well because of the synon-
ymous nature of the devices. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)
(governing the authorization of the interception of a wire or
oral communication); S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 90 (1968), re-
printed in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112 (detailing Congress's in-
tent that the coverage of Title III excludes pen registers).
92 442 U.S. 735.
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stitutionally protected privacy interest in the num-
bers one dials to initiate a telephone call."93
Adhering to Katz, the Court stated that the thresh-
old question was whether the alleged criminal sus-
pect had a reasonable expectation of privacy that
the government unlawfully invaded by using a
pen register. 94 The government's installation of
the pen register did not invade any constitution-
ally protected area.95 Furthermore, the device did
not capture the content of Smith's telephone
calls. 9 6 Therefore, because no protected area had
been invaded, the ultimate question was whether
Smith had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the numbers he dialed on his telephone.9 7 The
Court reasoned that there was no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the numbers dialed on a
telephone because telephone companies rou-
tinely record numbers dialed for business pur-
poses. 98 Moreover, because individuals voluntarily
provide the telephone company with the dialing
information, "it is too much to believe that tele-
phone subscribers . . .harbor any general expec-
tation that the numbers they dial will remain se-
cret."99 As a result, even if Smith did have an
expectation of privacy regarding the numbers
that he dialed on his telephone, this expectation
93 Id. While investigating a robbery and subsequent
threatening phone calls, police installed a pen register on
Smith's telephone line. Evidence gathered by the pen regis-
ter formed the basis for a warrant to search Smith's home.
Further evidence gathered during the search lead to Smith's
arrest. At trial, Smith argued that the evidence gathered by
the pen register should be inadmissible because it was ob-
tained without a search warrant. Smith appealed his subse-
quent conviction on the basis that the pen register informa-
tion had been improperly admitted into evidence. Id. at 737.
94 See id. at 740.
95 Id. at 741.
96 Id. (finding that pen registers, which do not capture
content like wiretaps, require a different analysis of the con-
stitutional issues); see also New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. at 167.
97 See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
98 Id. (finding that telephone companies need access to
phone numbers to complete calls through their switchboard,
tabulate billing records for long-distance toll calls and service
telephone lines, which includes facilitating law enforcement
functions).
99 Id. at 743. The site from where the call is placed is
irrelevant because it only reflects a desire to protect the pri-
vacy of content and not dialing information.
100 Id. (noting that one cannot have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the information voluntarily given to third
parties (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-45
(1976))).
101 See id. at 745-46.
102 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3)-(4).
103 See THE CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., AMENDING
THE PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE STATUTE IN RESPONSE
was unreasonable. 10 Consequently, the govern-
ment's use of the pen register was not a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and no warrant was necessary. 10 1 The Court's
holding in Smith, allowing the interception of the
digits of incoming and outgoing telephone calls,
serves as justification for the relatively low stan-
dard governing privacy protections for pen regis-
ter and trap and trace devices.10 2 More impor-
tantly, the Court's decision in Smith created
distinct classes of communications and afforded
less Fourth Amendment protection to noncon-
tent-based communications.10 3
Responding to these developments in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, Congress passed the
ECPA with the intention that this new law would
create a balance "between the privacy of citizens
and the needs of law enforcement" that had be-
come tipped too far in favor of the govern-
ment. 1 4 Improving electronic technologies had
created new methods of electronic surveillance,
and the increasing use of electronic communica-
tions, including the transportation of personal
data, had created more opportunities for govern-
ment to infringe upon constituti*onally protected
privacy rights. 10 5 Congress enacted the ECPA to
TO RECENT INTERNET DENIAL OF SERVICE ATrACKS AND TO Es-
TABLISH MEANINGFUL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS, at http://
www.cdt.org/sectirity/000404amending.shtml (Apr. 14,
2000) [hereinafter AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER].
104 Corn-Revere, supra note 14 (quoting The Office of
Technology Assessment that "[o]vertime, the cumulative ef-
fect of widespread surveillance for law enforcement, intelli-
gence, and other investigatory purposes could change the cli-
mate and fabric of society in fundamental ways").
1(5 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555. Title I of the ECPA amends Chapter 119
of Title 18 governing the interception of communications "to
bring it in line with technological developments and changes
in the structure of the telecommunications industry." The
Fourth Amendment and the Internet: Oversight Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the Judiciay,
106th Cong. 71, 76 (2000) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim,
Legislative Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Washington
Nat'l Office) [hereinafter Nojeim] (citing DOJ studies that
find nearly 75% of Americans oppose wiretapping and that
the loss of personal privacy in the new millennium is the pre-
dominant concern of Americans), available at http://
www.aclu.org/congress/1040600a.html; AMENDING THE PEN
REGISTER, supra note 103. Government agents use pen regis-
ter and trap and trace devices about ten times more fre-
quently than wiretaps. For instance, in the year 1996, 4,569
pen register and trap and trace orders were obtained by the
DOJ covering over 10,520 telephone lines. AMENDING THE
PEN REGISTER, supra note 103. See also Corn-Revere, supra
note 14. In the 1970s, the Church Committee investigations
documented the FBI's unjustified use of wiretaps on people
like Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., Congressman Harold Coo-
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preserve the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures of an
individual's electronic communications. 0 6 Con-
gress defined the term "electronic communica-
tion"10 7 in the ECPA broadly to provide statutory
protections for individual Fourth Amendment
rights against future advancements in technol-
ogy. 10 8
Despite congressional intent to increase protec-
tions for electronic communications,' 0 9 the ECPA
does not offer as much constitutional protection
for electronic communications as Title III offers
for voice communications. 10 Authorization for
an application to intercept electronic communica-
tions can be made by any government attorney,"'
whereas authority to apply for a wiretap can only
be granted by a high-ranking Justice Department
official." a2  Moreover, authorization for inter-
cepting electronic communications can be made
in conjunction with any federal felony by merely
showing that the information sought is relevant to
a criminal investigation.' 13 In contrast, telephone
wiretaps may only be used for certain felonies
enumerated in Title 111.114 In addition, the ECPA
provides greater protection against real-time in-
terception of electronic communications than it
does against government access to stored elec-
tronic communications.' 15 To make real-time in-
terceptions of electronic communications, gov-
ley, dissident groups and journalists. The Committee con-
cluded in light of technological advancements, government
agents are capable of intercepting and monitoring most pri-
vate communications. Corn-Revere, supra note 14.
106 See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555 (stating that Congress must act to protect
the privacy of citizens by updating laws to keep up with ad-
vancements in technology, which would ensure the contin-
ued vitality of the Fourth Amendment).
107 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining electronic communi-
cation as "any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images,
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted").
108 See Nojeim, supra note 105.
109 See id.
110 See id.
"1 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522; 18 U.S.C §§ 3121-3127
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
112 See id. at § 2516(1).
113 See id. at § 3123(a).
114 See id. at § 2516(1) (a).
115 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103; see
also Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (holding that individuals do not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their financial
records stored at their bank).
116 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3) (a); see also Nojeim, supra note
105.
117 See Nojeim, supra note 105. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2703
(1994), when the electronic communication has been in stor-
ernment agents must obtain a court order based
on probable cause."l 6 However, government
agents may obtain, without notice to the affected
party, the content of stored electronic communi-
cations with a search warrant issued by a federal
magistrate rather than a federal district court
judge.' 17 Therefore, the statutory protections pro-
vided to real-time electronic communications in
the ECPA are irrelevant once the communication
becomes stored data."" Law enforcement officials
have exploited this loophole in the ECPA, making
it easier to obtain lawfully intercepted electronic
communications from suspected criminals.1 19
3. The Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute
Enacted as Part of the ECPA120
The ECPA also amended Title III's provisions
for issuing a pen register or trap and trace de-
vice. 121 A pen register surveillance device is capa-
ble of capturing in real time the numbers dialed
on outgoing telephone calls. 122 Trap and trace de-
vices capture in real time the numbers of incom-
ing telephone calls. 123 Unlike the interception of
the content of electronic communications, gov-
ernment agents do not need to show probable
cause in order to obtain court authority for a pen
register or trap and trace device.' 24 A court will
grant authorization upon certification "that the
age for less than 180 days, the only means to obtain its con-
tent is with a warrant. However, the legal standard to justify
issuance of the warrant is whether the communication is rele-
vant to an ongoing investigation rather than the probable
cause required for real-time interceptions of electronic com-
munications. Id. at § 2703(d) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). If the
electronic communication has been electronically stored for
more than one hundred eighty days, it can be obtained in
more ways. To do so without notifying the affected party, a
warrant must be issued. With prior notice, government
agents may do so with a subpoena or court order. Nojeim,
supra note 105.
118 See Nojeim, supra note 105.
119 See id.; see also Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United
States Secret Service, 36 F.3d 457, 462-64 (5th Cir. 1994).
120 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
121 See id. at §§ 3121-3127; see also D. Ian Hopper, An In-
ternet 'Carnivore, at http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/
tech/dailynews/carnivore000727.html (July 27, 2000) ("In a
telephone 'trap and trace' or 'pen register' wiretap, authori-
ties can get a list of phone calls made to and from a certain
telephone number. The usable information is limited to the
10 digit telephone number and the time of the call."); Smith,
442 U.S. at 743 (holding that the numbers dialed on a tele-
phone are not private).
122 See 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3).
123 See id. at § 3127(4).
124 See id. at § 3123 (nothing that neither device should
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information likely to be obtained by such installa-
tion and use is relevant to an ongoing criminal
investigation."' 12 5 It is important to note that the
pen register and trap and trace statute does not
have any safeguards to prohibit the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 12 6
4. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994127
Congress made another attempt to redefine the
balance between individual Fourth Amendment
privacy rights and the government's need to con-
duct electronic surveillance of criminal activity
with the Communications Assistance for Law En-
forcement Act of 1994 ("CALEA"). 128 CALEA re-
quired telecommunications carriers to provide
law enforcement officials with assistance in re-
sponding to criminal use of improving technolo-
gies. 129 Surveillance techniques did not advance
at the same pace as communications technology,
making it more difficult for law enforcement
agents to monitor criminal activity.'3 0 CALEA
clearly did not extend to information services, in-
cluding online service providers. 13 1 However,
reveal the content of the intercepted communication, the
parties to the communication or even if the call was com-
pleted); see also AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103
(commenting that the standard for issuance is a "rubber
stamp").
125 18 U.S.C. § 3123(a). A court "shall enter an ex parte
order authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or
trap and trace device . . . [if the] information likely to be
obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation." Id.
The court order granting authority to a government agent to
use a pen register or trap and trace device in a particular
investigation must specify the targeted person and the
targeted telephone number. Id. See also AMENDING THE PEN
REGISTER, supra note 103 (arguing that "the standard of ap-
proval is so low as to be nearly worthless" in the protection of
privacy); Corn-Revere, supra note 14 (noting that the govern-
ment does not need to show probable cause because num-
bers dialed to make a telephone are not private communica-
tions).
126 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103 (re-
porting that there is no exclusionary rule tinder this statute,
the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule does not apply,
and there is no requirement for judicial supervision).
127 Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) (codified
in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
128 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 2000, Digital
Privacy Act of 2000, and Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act: Hear-
ings on H.R. 5018, H.R. 4987, and H.R 4908 Before the House
Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong. 139
(2000) (testimony of Robert Corn-Revere, Partner, Hogan &
Hartson, LLP) [hereinafter Hearings on Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act] (explaining that changes in the telecommu-
CALEA did not totally exempt Internet communi-
cations from electronic surveillance because the
government's ability to conduct electronic surveil-
lance under the ECPA was unaffected.13 2 In enact-
ing CALEA, Congress' clear intent was to preserve
the government's existing surveillance capabili-
ties. '. 33
Specifically, CALEA required that while carry-
ing out statutory obligations, such as assisting gov-
ernment agents with installation of wiretaps, tele-
communications carriers must restrict the
government's access to only the information for
which courts have authorized interception.1 34
CALEA also reinforces limitations on information
that the government can obtain using pen register
and trap and trace devices. 3 5 In addition, CALEA
required that government agents obtain a court
order before obtaining information relating to
electronic mail or online profiles.13 6
United States Telecom Ass'n. v. FCC 37 involved a
situation in which the Telecommunications In-
dustry Association ("TIA") developed standards
(called 'j-Standards") to fulfill its duties under
CALEA.' 38 The Center for Democracy and Tech-
nology ("CDT") argued that the J-Standard vio-
lated CALEA and petitioned the Federal Commu-
nications industry led carriers to end their cooperation with
government in preserving government's wiretapping capabil-
ities because without a uniform law requiring such coopera-
tion, those carriers who did cooperate were put at a competi-
tive disadvantage to those carriers who did not cooperate),
available at www.house.gov/judiciary.
129 See Pub. L. No. 103-414, 108 Stat. 4279 (1994) ("An
act to ... make clear a telecommunications carrier's duty to
cooperate in the interception of communications for law en-
forcement purposes."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2518(4) (provid-
ing that an order can be issued to enforce the assistance re-
quirements as set out in CALEA); Corn-Revere, supra note 14
("CALEA is the first statute to impose upon telecommunica-
tions carriers an affirmative obligation to modify and design
their equipment, facilities, and services to 'ensure that new
technologies and services do not hinder law enforcement's
access to the communications of a subscriber who is the sub-
ject of a court order authorizing electronic surveillance.' ").
130 See Corn-Revere, supra note 14.
131 See id. (discussing H.R. REP. 103-827(I), at 1 (1994)
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489).
132 See id.
113 See H.R. REP. 103-827(l), at 1 (1994), reprinted in 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3489 (setting "both a floor and a ceiling" on
government's ability to conduct electronic surveillance); see
also Corn-Revere, supra note 14.
1'-4 See 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (1994).
135 See id. at § 1002(a) (2).
136 See id. at § 1002(a)(1).
137 227 F.3d 450 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
138 Id. at 455-56. The TIA is an accredited standard set-
ting body that works in conjunction with the FBI. Id.
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nications Commission ("FCC") to remove the
offending provisions. 3 9 The FBI and DOJ also pe-
titioned the FCC, but argued that the J-Standard
fell below CALEA's requirements. 140 The DOJ
provided the FCC a list ("FBI punch list") of sur-
veillance capabilities that it wanted added to TIA's
J-Standard. 14 1 The FCC added four of the FBI
punch list capabilities to the J-Standard and re-
fused to remove from the J-Standard the two pro-
visions to which the CDT objected. 142 The matter
was appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia.' 43
Once there, the appeals court considered the
validity of the FCC provisions imposing duties on
telecommunications carriers under CALEA. 144
The petitioners alleged that the FCC's implemen-
tation of the punch list items exceeded the scope
of CALEA. 145 The appeals court stated that Con-
gress' intent in enacting CALEA was to preserve
the government's ability, pursuant to proper au-
thority, to intercept communications by requiring
telecommunications carriers to build surveillance-
ready networks. 146 The appeals court also noted
that CALEA was intended to maintain the status
quo in electronic surveillance as shown by the stat-
utory duty of telecommunications carriers to pro-
tect communications that the government does
not have the authority to intercept. 47
III. THE INTERNET TODAY
Today, the Internet is quickly becoming the ma-
jor vehicle for global communications and social
activity 418 The Internet is constantly evolving and
accessible, drawing more and more people who
desire to make use of its virtually unlimited appli-
cations. 1 49 The uses for which people employ the
Internet are vastly increasing; they include elec-
tronic mail, shopping and electronic commerce,
as well as transferring "financial statements, medi-
cal records, and information about children."' 50
As uses for the Internet continue to evolve, more
personal data will be transferred online.' 5 1 The
unintended, and potentially harmful, byproduct
of this development is that it makes a massive
amount "of sensitive data available to government
investigators.'1 52
The interception of Internet communications
will likely increase as digital technology improves
and becomes more widely used.153 Digital tech-
nology allows government agents to capture and
process more communications than what was pos-
sible with analog communications. 5 4 With analog
communications, "a single circuit is opened be-
tween caller and recipient and all electronic sig-
nals that make up the communication travel
along the circuit."1 55 In contrast, digital commu-
139 Id.
140 Id. at 456.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 456-57. Appeals by the petitioner, Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association, CDT, Electronic
Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy Information Center
and the American Civil Liberties Union were consolidated
into this case.
144 See id. at 457 (reviewing the FCC's provisions requir-
ing that carriers make available the location of antenna tow-
ers, signaling information from custom calling features, num-
bers dialed after calls are connected and packet mode data).
145 See id.
146 See id. at 454-55.
147 See id. ("CALEA permits the telecommunications in-
dustry, in consultation with law enforcement agencies ... to
develop its own technical standards for meeting the required
surveillance capabilities." (citing 47 U.S.C. § 1006)).
148 See ACLU v. Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029, 1031
(D.N.M. 1998) (making a finding of fact that the Internet is a
"global medium of communication that links people, institu-
tions, corporations and governments around the world"); see
also Davidson, supra note 7. Davidson referred to a Harris
poll from December 1999 revealing that 56%-six times
more than just four years ago-of American adults use the
Internet. This statistic does not include the widespread use of
the Internet in schools. See Davidson, supra note 7
149 See Davidson, supra note 7 (commenting that the In-
ternet promises to "promote expression, spur economic op-
portunity, and reinvigorate civic discourse").
150 Id. Indeed, this explosion of online activity has come
to be known as the Internet revolution.
151 See id. (noting that electronic communications in-
creasingly contain sensitive content relevant to an individ-
ual's "actions, relationships, and thoughts").
152 Corn-Revere, supra note 14 (stating that the elec-
tronic wiretap has replaced the telephone wiretap as the
most common form of surveillance).
153 See The Fourth Amendment and Carnivore Before the House
Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong., at
www.house.gov/judiciary (2000) (statement of Barry Stein-
hardt, Assoc. Dir. Am. Civil Liberties Union) [hereinafter
Steinhardt].
154 See id. (contrasting the labor intensive practice of in-
tercepting analog communications with the use of computers
that can assist government agents in processing intercepted
digital communications).
155 United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 450.
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nications are broken into data packets that travel
independently across networks and "are then reas-
sembled in the proper sequence" at the commu-
nication's destination. 15 6 Each data packet con-
sists of two components. One component is the
address information, which appears in the
packet's header and, like an envelope address, en-
sures that the communication arrives at the
proper location and is reassembled in the correct
sequence. The second component is the body, or
payload of the communication, which contains
the communication's content.1 57
A. How Carnivore Works
Increasingly, criminals are using the Internet to
commit crimes. 158 The FBI claims that it has had a
difficult time pursuing cyber criminals because its
agents lack vital support technology necessary to
catch this new breed of criminal suspects.' 5 '- As a
result, the FBI developed the diagnostic tool Car-
nivore to conduct electronic surveillance of elec-
tronic mail messages and other online communi-
cations."' ° The FBI plugs a personal computer
running the Carnivore software into the surveil-
lance target's ISP network.' 6 ' The system's opera-
tor then uses a Graphical User Interface, such as a
touch screen, to set the system's filters.' 62 Carni-
vore, classified as a "packet filter" or "packet snif-
fer,"163 searches, intercepts and then collects the
digital data packets identified as the surveillance
target's electronic communications, while ignor-
156 Id.
157 See id.
158 See Carnivore and the Fourth Amendment Before the House
Judiciay Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong., at
www.lexis-nexis.com/congcom (2000) (statement of Kevin V.
Di Gregory, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., United States
Dep't ofJustice) [hereinafter Gregory].
159 See Davidson, supra note 7. However, recent advance-
ments in technology have greatly improved the government's
ability to conduct electronic surveillance. So much so that in
the next decade the FBI predicts a 300% increase in the use
of wiretaps. However, the reality is that the Internet benefits
both criminals and law enforcement agents. Id.
160 See Kerr, supra note 8.
161 See Carnivore and The Fourth Amendment: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the judici-
ary, 106th Cong., at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/
perr0724.htm (2000) (statement of Tom Perrine, Computer
Security Office, San Diego Supercomputer Ctr.).
162 See id.
163 Id.
164 See id. (operating as a packet sniffer, Carnivore can
capture downloaded files, online conversations and e-mail
messages).
ing all other communications that the govern-
ment has no authority to intercept.1 6 4 The cap-
tured data is then stored on a removable disk. 165
Functioning like a pen register or trap and
trace device, Carnivore can provide the origin and
destination of all communications traveling across
the ISP's network going from and coming to the
alleged criminal suspect's computer. 16 6 However,
Carnivore also is capable of performing wiretap
functions because it can monitor and record the
content of Internet communications, such as e-
mail messages. 167 Therefore, the government can
use Carnivore pursuant to either a wiretap order,
which allows the interception of content, or
under a pen register and trap and trace order that
only authorizes interception of numbers related
to communications from or to specified targets. 68
The potential that data mining can take place
under pen register- and trap and trace orders
poses an unreasonable threat to Fourth Amend-
ment rights. 169 Questions abound concerning
who controls the filter settings on Carnivore and
who oversees the FBI in order to assure that gov-
ernment agents only make lawful use of the sys-
tem.' 70 The threat is made more dangerous when
one considers that the FBI can control Carnivore
from a remote location in order to monitor the
data collected and to change the filter settings. 17
Additionally, not having an opportunity to review
Carnivore's program code has created a fear
among ISPs of the possible side affects that Carni-
vore may have on their network operations and
165 See id.
166 See Davidson, supra note 7.
167 See id.
168 AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103. E-mail
addresses are unique to individual users-unlike telephones
that can be used communally-so it is likely that a pen regis-
ter will reveal the identity of the message's recipient. Addi-
tionally, if Carnivore can capture URLs, website addresses or
file names, the information the government obtains will
likely reveal the substance of the communication's contents.
Id.; see also Brown, 50 F.3d at 294 (holding that numbers di-
aled into digital pagers are considered to be content and
therefore subject to government interception only through
properly authorized wiretaps).
169 See Corn-Revere, supra note 14 (arguing that using
pen register and trap and trace capabilities in this instance
violates congressional intent to protect Fourth Amendment
rights through the ECPA).
170 See Davidson, supra note 7.
171 See Ted Bridis and Neil King Jr., Politics and Technol-
ogy: The FBI Lobbies to Show Carnivore Doesn't Eat Privacy, TIE
WALL S'r. J. EUROPE, July 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL-WSJE
21066796 [hereinafter Bridis & King].
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security systems. 172
Pen register devices and trap and trace orders
are obtained under a "standard of approval so low
as to be nearly worthless,"'173 and there are no
provisions for judicial or ISP oversight of Carni-
vore when used under this kind of authority.1 74
For example, when the government employs Car-
nivore under a pen register or trap and trace or-
der, the system maintains its potential to conduct
wiretapping functions. 1 75 Moreover, pen register
and trap and trace devices were designed to inter-
cept telephone dialing information, and it is not
clear what the Internet equivalent is to numbers
dialed on a telephone. 176 Those concerned with
preserving Fourth Amendment rights question
whether packet headers (the addressing informa-
tion) can be separated from packet bodies or pay-
loads (the contents of Internet communica-
tions). 1 7 7 The letters in an e-mail address are not
analogous to the numbers used for making tele-
phone calls because e-mail addresses, Internet
protocol addresses, header information and URLs
can reveal more information (such as the identi-
ties of the parties and the contents of the commu-
nication) than incoming or outgoing telephone
numbers reveal under a "normal" pen register or
trap and trace device. 178 There is a very real threat
that, when applied to Internet communications,
pen register and trap and trace devices will inter-
cept the communication's content unlawfully. 17
Carnivore's ability to capture vast amounts of data
has the potential to provide a detailed picture or
profile of a person's associations, habits, contacts,
interests and activities, which are all outside the
permissible scope of government surveillance
172 See Davidson, supra note 7 (arguing that without a re-
view of Carnivore's source code, questions remain unan-
swered about the accuracy of the audit trails and system's
safeguards against tampering).
"3 Id.
174 See id. (finding that the lack ofjudicial oversight cre-
ates a potential for misuse).
175 See id. (noting that this additional capacity is what
makes Carnivore different from the trap and trace and pen
register devices used in connection with telephone surveil-
lance because Carnivore has the capability to scan headers,
subject lines and content information).
176 See Steinhardt, supra note 153 ("On the Internet, the
only time numbers are literally 'dialed' by a telephone is
when a user connects to an ISP using a dial up modem.").
177 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103.
178 See Steinhardt, supra note 153.
179 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103.
180 See id.
181 See id.
under the Fourth Amendment. 80
Moreover, unlike wiretap orders, pen register
and trap and trace devices do not have a minimi-
zation rule. This rule requires that, in executing a
wiretap order, law enforcement agents must mini-
mize the interception of nonincriminating com-
munications.' 8' The lack of a minimization rule
for pen register and trap and trace devices be-
comes more notable when one considers that, re-
gardless of whether it is authorized by a wiretap,
pen register or trap and trace device, Carnivore
scans the contents of every single communication
traveling on the ISP's network.'8 2 This gives the
government access to the communications of the
targeted suspect, nontargeted subscribers and
every person who communicates with that ISP's
customers.'8 3 In effect, this capability makes Car-
nivore a maximization tool rather than the mini-
mization tool required by the Fourth Amendment
because "Carnivore is roughly equivalent to a
wiretap capable of accessing the contents of the
conversations of all of the phone company's cus-
tomers." 
8 4
Questions also remain unanswered about the
system's technical capabilities because the FBI has
refused to reveal Carnivore's source code.8 5 In
fact, there was no public oversight in developing
Carnivore. 18 6 Constitutional scholars and industry
experts are among the many who argue that
granting the public access to its source code (the
technical blueprint behind a software program
like Carnivore) would end the controversy sur-
rounding Carnivore by increasing public under-
standing and allowing for review by independent
experts.'i 7 "[I]solating network traffic can be
182 See Steinhardt, supra note 153.
183 See High Tech Investigations, Hearing Before the House Ju-
diciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 106th Cong., at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/stei0724.htm (2000) (state-
ment of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir., Am. Civil Liberties
Union) [hereinafter ACLU); see also Nojeim, supra note 105.
This is the type of search and seizure the Fourth Amendment
protects against. Statistics for 1969-1973 detail that over 50%
of intercepted electronic communications were incriminat-
ing. In contrast, from 1994-1998, statistics reveal that only
20% of intercepted electronic communications were incrimi-
nating. For each electronic surveillance interception, 1,608
innocent conversations are intercepted. The data for 1998
shows that as the use of electronic surveillance has risen to an
all-time high, the percent of innocent communications inter-
cepted has risen as well. Id.
184 ACLU, supra note 183.
185 See Davidson, supra note 7.
186 See id.
187 See id.
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technically difficult," and it may not be possible
for the government to obtain the e-mail addresses
of incoming and outgoing messages for a particu-
lar subscriber.188 Additionally, it may not be possi-
ble to separate the source or destination informa-
tion of a communication from the
communication's content. 89
B. The Government's Position on Carnivore
The government counters Carnivore's critics by
arguing that the potential capabilities of Carni-
vore are irrelevant because court orders specify
the extent to which the wiretap device can inter-
cept data from electronic communications.190
Moreover, the government claims that it will only
use Carnivore for cases in which the ISP is unable
to obtain the information or when the ISP re-
quests that the government use its own equip-
ment to obtain the information.' 9 ' The FBI justi-
fies its refusal to reveal Carnivore's source code by
arguing that doing so would allow criminals to de-
velop methods to defeat the system.' 92 However,
this argument is strained because the government
is asking the public to accept its word that govern-
ment agents will not exceed the scope of a court
order authorizing the interception of electronic
communications. "3 Nevertheless, the govern-
ment asserts that there are substantial safeguards
188 1I. (commenting that Internet protocol addresses,
the numbers making up an e-mail address, may be changed
overtime and result in a failure to intercept the targeted com-
munications or the interception of communications from the
wrong user).
189 See id. Source or destination information varies de-
pending "on what layer of the Internet protocol stack one
looks at [sic]." Id. Source and destination information can be
found in the header Ethernet address of the local network;
the "IP address of an ISP's mail server; [and] the To: line of
an e-mail message." Id. For example, a URL not only provides
the location of the data's source, but having obtained that
URL, a government agent can visit the same site and view the
contents of the communication. Id.
190 See Gregory, supra note 158.
191 Id.
192 See Michael J. Sniffen, Chewing Out 'Carnivore,'
ABcNEWS.coM, Aug. 25, 2000, available at http://
more.abcnews.go.com/sections/tech/dailynews/carni-
vore000825.html. The Justice Department selected a private
organization to review Carnivore. The review will consider
whether Carnivore provides all the information the govern-
ment should see but none of the information the govern-
ment should not see; or if it poses risks to the ISP's network
or contains effective safeguards against unauthorized use. Id.
193 See generally McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514
U.S. 334 (1995) (holding that the First Amendment protects
to discourage and punish unlawful uses of Carni-
vore. '94 In addition to judicial oversight and court
authorization, the DOJ, which includes the FBI,
has installed what it argues are sufficient internal
oversight mechanisms for Carnivore's use.1 9 5 For
example, although Carnivore scans every commu-
nication on the ISPs network, the system's filters
are configured to record only the communica-
tions of the surveillance target. 196 Moreover, Car-
nivore logs the filter settings and reports its activ-
ity in audit trails,"9 7 and agents who misuse
Carnivore are subject to both civil and criminal
penalties.'9-8 The government also claims that an
individual agent acting alone is unlikely to abuse
Carnivore because the system's installation and
operation require support from both technical ex-
perts and the ISP.''
Accepting the government's word is an implicit
rejection of the Fourth Amendment and the prin-
ciples on which it stands.2111' Historically, the FBI
has failed to uphold the promises it has made re-
garding self-imposed limitations on law enforce-
ment capabilities. 20 1 Therefore, the reality is that
Congress should take action to update the statu-
tory scheme governing electronic surveillance and
enact further protections for individual privacy on
the Internet.21 12 The consequences of congres-
sional inaction concerning the scope of electronic
surveillance and Carnivore could very well create
an individual's right to speak anonymously).
194 See Kerr, supra note 8. But see ACLU, supra note 183
(noting that the government's "trust us" approach is inade-
quate to preserve the principles underlying the Fourth
Amendment).
195 See Kerr, supra note 8.
196 See Davidson, supra note 7 (stating that in theory, Car-
nivore is a minimization tool that is programmed to store
only specific communications). But see Steinhardt, supra note
153 (stating that in effect, the government "asks you to trust
it with unsupervised access to the entire stream of communi-
cations over an ISP's network").
197 See Gregory, supra note 158.
1908 See Kerr, supra note 8.
199 See Bridis & King, supra note 171; see also Kerr, supra
note 8.
200 See Steinhardt, supra note 153 (arguing that the
Fourth Amendment is built on the premise "that the Execu-
tive cannot be trusted with carte blanche authority when it
conducts a search").
211 See id. (detailing the FBI's attempts to circumvent the
bargain struck by CALEA in preserving the status quo of gov-
ernment surveillance capabilities).
202 See Corn-Revere, supra note 14. The Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act dates from 1968, and the most
recent update to surveillance laws, the ECPA, dates from
1986.
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a chilling effect on communications. 203 Moreover,
the American public's fear of electronic surveil-
lance fosters distrust of the government.204 This
combination could undermine the Internet's ex-
pansion. 20 5 Therefore, today's climate of advanc-
ing technology once again requires redefining the
balance between personal liberties and the need
of law enforcement to monitor criminal activ-
ity.206
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE
THAT CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS EXTEND TO INTERNET
COMMUNICATIONS
A. The Feasibility of a CALEA Framework
In considering the scope of CALEA's definition
of call-identifying information in United States
Telecom Ass'n, the court noted that CALEA does
not cross-reference or incorporate the ECPA defi-
nitions or statutory provisions regarding pen reg-
ister or trap and trace devices. 20 7 However, the
court still questioned whether the requirement
under CALEA to provide call-identifying informa-
tion can be used lawfully to obtain all digits dialed
after a call connection has been established. o20
The court stated that so called "dialed digit ex-
traction" may violate Fourth Amendment privacy
rights because it is just as likely that the digits
comprise call content as call-identifying informa-
tion.2 09 As a result, the court refused to add dialed
203 See generally Davidson, supra note 7 (stating that Amer-
ican citizens should not have to choose between keeping
their communications private and participating in the In-
ternet revolution).
204 See Nojeim, supra note 105.
205 See id.
206 See Corn-Revere, supra note 14 (noting that "the law
must be updated to keep up with changes in technology").
207 See United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 450 (consid-
ering the validity of the FBI punch list provision requiring
telecommunications carriers to monitor call content to cap-
ture all digits dialed after calls have been connected in light
of CALEA's ambiguous definition of call-identifying informa-
tion).
208 See id. Digits dialed after a call has been established
may include telephone numbers, but might include content
such as bank account numbers or passwords.
209 Id.; see, e.g., Brown, 50 F.3d at 294 (holding that num-
bers sent to pagers are content receiving Fourth Amendment
protection).
210 See United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 466 (vacat-
ing and remanding to allow for further consideration of
whether dialed digit extraction is legally permissible when
performed under a pen register or trap and trace order).
digit extraction to the J-Standard.2 1 0 Despite the
court's reluctance to find information gathered
by pen register and trap and trace devices analo-
gous to call-identifying information, 21 i the deci-
sion does just that very thing.
Applying the court's analysis to a potential legal
challenge to Carnivore will lead to a similar result.
Like dialed digit extraction, the information that
Carnivore reveals under a pen register or trap and
trace device court order may reveal the contents
of Internet communications in violation of the
Fourth Amendment.2 12 Unfortunately, current
law "is far from clear on the use of pen register or
trap and trace devices in the Internet context."2I3
Therefore, United States Telecom Ass'n is useful in
illustrating how a CALEA-like framework-where
standards developed by the telecommunications
industry outline what telecommunications carri-
ers must provide government agents employing
electronic surveillance-may prevent Carnivore
from invading Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
This case demonstrates that even dialed digits can
contain content deserving Fourth Amendment
protection.2 14 Applied to electronic mail and
other Internet communications, this proposition
should raise concerns that even if Carnivore's fil-
ters are set to capture only header information,
the data intercepted will likely contain content.2 15
As the congressional intent behind CALEA was
to maintain the status quo in electronic surveil-
lance, any change to the ECPA concerning Carni-
vore should reflect this intent.2 16 ISPs should re-
211 See id. at 462.
212 See generally Davidson, supra note 7. More information
is transported across the Internet than is transported using
telephones, so the same surveillance devices net different re-
sults with the two media. Electronic surveillance of Internet
communications reveals more information than phone taps,
and therefore should have to satisfy a higher legal standard
before a court authorizes their use. The most recent action
involving electronic surveillance laws dates back to 1986, and
these laws need revision to ensure that constitutional protec-
tions extend to the Internet as it stands today. Id.
213 Corn-Revere, supra note 14 (stating that when used
on the Internet, these devices have the potential to be much
more intrusive, raising new Fourth Amendment issues that
need resolution).
214 See generally United States Telecom Ass'n, 227 F.3d at 450.
215 See, e.g., People v. Bialostok, 610 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y.
1993) (holding that a pen register device, capable of inter-
cepting content information, can only be used with a valid
wiretap order); People v. Kramer, 701 N.Y.S.2d 78 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1999).
2116 See Corn-Revere, supra note 14. Following the con-
gressional intent underlying CALEA when changing the
ECPA will require restricting Carnivore's capabilities and lim-
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tain control over their networks. Under the
equivalent of industry standards, ISPs should face
the statutory duty to provide law enforcement offi-
cials, with proper court authority, access only to
information to which they are legally entitled.2 17
Because the J-Standards in CALEA have built-in
provisions for agency and judicial review, these
standards should serve as the model for future
statutory control of Carnivore. Not only are ISPs
the most technically qualified to install and oper-
ate systems such as Carnivore on their networks
but also their involvement will serve as an added
check against a government agent's unauthorized
use.218 In other words, ISP's should be responsi-
ble for protecting privacy rights against unautho-
rized government interception. 2 19 Congress
should require the ISP to directly oversee the sep-
aration of the surveillance target's communica-
tions from other communications traveling across
ISP networks. 220 Furthermore, if ISPs are capable
and willing to furnish the information that the
government has authority to intercept, the gov-
ernment should not be permitted to reject this of-
fer and instead use Carnivore to obtain the infor-
mation. 22' If an ISP refuses to assist the
government, the government should still be re-
quired to satisfy Title III before conducting elec-
tronic surveillance.2 22 Additionally, if ISPs are
compelled to assist law enforcement officials us-
ing Carnivore, the government should be re-
quired to reveal information about Carnivore's
operations and source code to the ISP.223
B. Limiting Electronic Surveillance by
Strengthening Current Laws
The Katz Court declared that the Fourth
Amendment's protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to people wherever
they may be because interpreting the Constitution
iting the burdens it places on ISPs.
217 See Davidson, supra note 7. Rather than having Carni-
vore sit entirely outside the ISP's network and control, the
device should be installed similarly to a pen register or trap
and trace device, both of which require phone company as-
sistance.
218 See id. (detailing the role of ISP's in limiting govern-
ment access to only that which has been properly author-
ized).
219 See Steinhardt, supra note 153.
220 See id.
221 See id.
222 See id.
223 See id.
to say otherwise "is to ignore the vital role that the
public telephone has come to play in private com-
munications. '" 224 Today, this statement applies to
the Internet, making the presence or absence of a
physical intrusion irrelevant to whether a search
or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment.225 In-
dividuals using the Internet as a mode of commu-
nication have reasonable expectations of privacy
that require greater legal protections than cur-
rent laws provide. 22"6 Therefore, Congress should
amend the ECPA to require that any information
other than the equivalent of dialed numbers is
only accessible with a valid wiretap order.2 27 This
would exclude "search terms, URLs identifying
certain documents, files, web pages, or other
transactional information" from the definition of
dialed numbers.22 ' Moreover, because Carnivore
performs wiretapping functions, the legal stan-
dard supporting pen register orders should be
raised to a probable cause standard. 229 This would
close the loophole through which government
agents have previously been able to capture con-
tent information without a wiretap order and re-
lated judicial oversight.2 3 0
The ECPA also should be amended to contain
an exclusionary rule similar to the one in Title III
that prohibits the use of improperly obtained in-
formation. 23' Likewise, Congress should impose
requirements for reporting statistics and record
keeping modeled after those in Title 111.232 Cur-
rently, the ECPA only requires reporting of pen
register and trap and trace orders for which the
DOJ applies, not those "by other Federal law en-
forcement agencies or state and local authori-
ties. ' 2 33 Requiring government agents to report
use of electronic surveillance will ensure a degree
of accountability currently absent in electronic
surveillance. 234 Finally, the ECPA should be
amended to include civil and criminal sanc-
tions-similar to those found in Title III for abus-
224 Katz, 389 U.S. at 352.
225 See id.
226 See Hearings on Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
supra note 128.
227 See AMENDING T-HE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103.
228 !d.
229 See Davidson, supra note 7.
2301 See id.
23 1 See id.
232 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103; see,
e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9) (1994).
233 AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103.
234 See Hearings on Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
supra note 128.
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ing pen register and trap and trace devices-for
abusing Carnivore. 235
Updating surveillance laws strengthens privacy
protections that have been eroded under current
laws that do not apply easily to the Internet.236
The Constitution should not be literally con-
strued because the Founders intended a flexible
approach that would allow the Constitution to re-
main effective in the face of changing circum-
stances. 237 Therefore, Congress should consider
taking a stronger position on electronic surveil-
lance by amending the ECPA to require that pen
register and trap and trace orders cannot be used
for intercepting Internet communications. In
other words, Congress should make a properly is-
sued Title III wiretap order the only method by
which government agents receive authorization to
conduct electronic surveillance of Internet com-
munications. In effect, all Internet communica-
tions should be classified as content and therefore
not lawfully accessible with pen register or trap
and trace orders.238 The risk that pen register and
trap and trace devices will capture content is sim-
ply too great to believe that the application of
these devices to the Internet can be satisfactorily
resolved in a manner that comports with the
Fourth Amendment.
Congress also must boost the applicability of
the Fourth Amendment's minimization rule in or-
der to protect the Internet communications of
both surveillance targets and nontargeted private
citizens communicating over the Internet.23 9 Car-
nivore functions by scanning every communication
that travels over the ISP's network.2 40 Therefore,
the minimization rule should declare expressly
that under no circumstances does the govern-
ment have the authority to intercept communica-
tions that are not the subject of a proper Title III
court order authorizing electronic surveillance. 241
235 See Davidson, supra note 7.
236 See id.
237 See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 484 (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing).
238 See Davidson, supra note 7. In other words, do not ap-
ply the rule set out in Smith, 442 U.S. at 745-46. See also
Brown, 50 F.3d at 294 (holding that numbers dialed into
pagers are content and receive Fourth Amendment protec-
tion).
239 See ACLU, supra note 183.
240 See Steinhardt, supra note 153.
241 See id. (acknowledging that this would require limit-
ing Carnivore's ability to access nontargeted communica-
tions).
242 SeeACLU, supra note 183.
If Congress elects to remedy the situation by rais-
ing the legal standard for pen register and trap
and trace devices, the wiretap minimization rule
needs to be strengthened, and a minimization
rule must be adopted that applies to pen register
and trap and trace devices.242
Requiring the FBI to submit Carnivore's source
code for public review will let the public know
that the government is capable of monitoring the
electronic communications scanned by FBI
agents. 2 43 Public review of Carnivore's source
code can be useful in identifying "mistakes, bugs,
or security holes unknown to the FBI. ' 244 This
knowledge will enable the public and ISPs to serve
as checks on government surveillance activities as
well as alleviate the chilling effect produced by
the mystery surrounding Carnivore's capabili-
ties. 245 In addition, Congress should enact laws to
require greater oversight by both the court issuing
the order authorizing the interception of elec-
tronic communications and by the ISP whose net-
work is involved in the electronic surveillance.2 46
ISPs rightfully claim that they should have ulti-
mate control over their networks, including the
installation and use of Carnivore by government
agents.247 The protection of stored electronic
communications should be equivalent to the pro-
tection currently afforded to communications in-
tercepted in real time.248 Title III wiretap stan-
dards should apply to capturing stored electronic
data because content does not change when a
communication becomes stored. 249 Currently,
government agents can obtain the same informa-
tion but under a much less stringent legal stan-
dard by making the interception a second after
the communication is received and stored on the
user's system. 2
50
In considering revisions to current electronic
surveillance laws, Congress will confront the fact
243 See Steinhardt, supra note 153 (discussing the ACLU's
filing of a Freedom of Information Act request with the FBI
for documents concerning Carnivore's system operations);
see also Davidson, supra note 7.
244 Davidson, supra note 7.
245 See id.
246 See Steinhardt, supra note 153.
247 See Davidson, supra note 7; see also Kerr, supra note 8.
The FBI can operate Carnivore independently of any ISP in-
volvement, but court orders require that ISP's be notified
and able to assist in the installation of the device.
248 See Hearings on Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
supra note 128.
249 See id.
250 See id.
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that the Cable Communications Privacy Act of
1984251 ("Cable Act") currently provides greater
protections for electronic communications made
using a cable modem than that provided by Title
III or the ECPA. 252 As a result, Congress should
resolve the differences between the three differ-
ent levels of protection in order to protect Fourth
Amendment rights on a uniform basis for all
forms of communication. 253 To adopt any stan-
dard of protection for Fourth Amendment rights
less than what the Cable Act provides will seriously
harm the Fourth Amendment.254
C. Justice Department Proposals
The Justice Department has proposed legisla-
tion that would allow judges to issue countrywide
pen register and trap and trace orders.255 The jus-
tification offered for this proposal is that the gov-
ernment's ability to track Internet communica-
tions is hampered by the need to obtain an order
in each physical jurisdiction through which the
communication passes in cyberspace. 2 56 Notably,
the government's proposal also includes orders
authorizingthe interception of telephone call in-
formation that do not face a similar burden. 257
Moreover, the proposal does not require the gov-
ernment to make a showing as to why the order
should be effective nationwide. 258 Eliminating ju-
risdictional limits on the use of these surveillance
devices has the effect of encouraging their ex-
panded use.25 1 However, before encouraging
more widespread use of pen register and trap and
trace devices, Congress should address the ques-
tions raised about how these devices apply to In-
ternet communications. 26 Failing to do so may
251 Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
252 See Steinhardt, supra note 153 (noting that unlike Ti-
tle III and the ECPA, the Cable Act requires the government
to give prior notice to the subject of the surveillance).
253 See id.
254 See id.
255 See AMENDING THlE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103.
256 See Steinhardt, supra note 153.
257 See id.
258 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103.
259 See id. (arguing that the bill's other provisions in com-
bination with the reduction of local judicial oversight threat-
ens privacy rights because more personal information will be
collected); Steinhardt, supra note 153 (noting that the legisla-
tion also may encourage forum shopping because one order
will be effective in every jurisdiction).
lead to a further erosion of Fourth Amendment
and privacy rights. 26 1
The Justice Department also proposes increas-
ing the legal standard governing the issuance of
pen register or trap and trace devices under
ECPA.262 The proposal applies Tide III standards
for intercepting the content of telephone calls to
the interception of the content of electronic com-
munications. 2 63 This change would increase
ECPA protections of electronic communications
to a level comparable with Title III's protections
of voice communications.2 64 Changes would in-
clude requiring: a high ranking DOJ official,
rather than any government attorney, to approve
applications for intercepting electronic communi-
cations; probable cause that an enumerated fel-
ony, not any felony, has been committed; and
courts to apply the exclusionary rule to evidence
obtained in violation of proper procedures. 265
These changes are justifiable on the grounds that
e-mail, like voice communication, is a spontane-
ous form of communication. 266 Although this will
make it more difficult for government agents to
obtain court authority to conduct electronic sur-
veillance, this provision does not address Carni-
vore's ability to scan every communication of
every user on the ISP's network because requiring
a higher legal standard does not address the
Fourth Amendment's requirement for minimiza-
tion.267 Nor does it address the discrepancy in
protection of electronic communications stored
by third parties. 268 Until stored electronic com-
munications are afforded the same protections as
real-time communications, government agents
will be able to circumvent the law by intercepting
the communication after it has become stored. 269
2610 See AMENDING THE PEN REGISTER, supra note 103 (ar-
guing that current laws covering the issuance and scope of
surveillance devices should be amended to strengthen pri-
vacy protections).
261 See Corn-Revere, supra note 14.
262 See Steinhardt, supra note 153 (noting that this pro-
posal will only be effective if the new standard is significant).
263 See id.
264 See id.
265 See id.
266 See id.
267 See id.
268 See id.
269 See id. (explaining that it is highly probable that the
reason a person stores an e-mail message is because it is im-
portant; therefore, it is the one most needing privacy protec-
tions).
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D. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
2000270
Legislation currently before Congress would es-
tablish greater protections against both the inter-
ception of real-time electronic communications
and the disclosure of stored electronic communi-
cations.271 H.R. 5018, or the Electronic Communi-
cations Privacy Act of 2000, increases the report-
ing requirements for government agents
conducting electronic surveillance using wire-
taps.2 72 Obtaining this information is a major step
in beginning to understand the extent and depth
of the government's use of electronic surveil-
lance. 273 However, the bill will not have a signifi-
cant impact on Fourth Amendment rights unless
it also applies to electronic surveillance using pen
register and trap and trace orders. As with wiretap
orders, reporting information for pen register
and trap and trace devices will serve to make the
government accountable for its actions.274 Con-
gress also should consider including in the
270 See H.R. 5018, 106th Cong. (2000), available at http:
//thomas.loc.gov [hereinafter ECPA 2000].
271 See id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2515 to read
"whenever any wire, oral, or electronic communication has
been intercepted, or any electronic communication in elec-
tronic storage has been disclosed").
272 See id. (proposing to amend 18 U.S.C. § 2 7 03 (g) to
require reporting the fact the an order was applied for and
granted, and the information obtained, including the num-
ber of incriminating communications disclosed).
273 See Hearings on Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
amendments the Title III provision that requires
notice to the suspect before the intercepted In-
ternet communications can be used in a criminal
proceeding.2 75 The bill, however, does include an
important provision to raise the legal standard for
obtaining proper authorization for a pen register
or trap and trace order. 276
V. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures applies to pri-
vate Internet communications. Carnivore, the
government's new electronic surveillance device,
demonstrates that current surveillance laws are
outdated in today's wired world. Neither Congress
nor the Justice Department advocates solutions
that will resolve the issues surrounding the chang-
ing technology in electronic surveillance used by
government agents.
supra note 128. It is logical that as the government expands
its use of electronic surveillance, a similar expansion of re-
porting should take place.
274 See id.
275 See id.
276 See ECPA 2000, supra note 270. ECPA proposes to
amend 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b)(2) (1994) to require a showing
of factual evidence rather than mere relevance to an ongoing
criminal investigation. This is the same standard the govern-
ment must meet to obtain stored electronic communications
under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d). Id.
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